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A: Project Development Objectives
1. Project development objective and key performance indicators (see Annex 1):
This project aims to provide technical assistance to support reforms in the areas central to the efforts
of the Korean Government for effective management of the problems in the financial and corporate sectors and
for sustained strong and stable growth in today's more integrated and competitive global economy: financial
sector restructuring and development, including capital market development; and corporate sector reform,
including corporate restructuring and reform of corporate governance and competition policies. The project
supports measures to:
(i) reduce the likelihood of systemic failure in the banking and corporate sectors through strengthening the
capacity for monitoring and managing financial crisis in these sectors, and deepening the structural
reforms; and reduce economic risks through improved debt management;
(ii) improve the financial soundness of banks and corporations, particularly their financial leverage, through
strategy formulation, improvement of the financial sector regulatory framework, strengthening of
securities markets, work-out of corporations driven by their lead banks with the help of an arbitration
committee, and the deepening of capacity for restructuring banks and corporations; and
(iii) deepen a broad process of change in state institutions, banks and corporations towards less government
involvement in business, better enterprise transparency and governance, stronger focus on financial
results, and more openness to global competition and investment through the catalytic role of advisors
with international experience, institutional development in newly structured entities like FSC, and the
strengthening of self-regulatory institutions.
This project would be part of a broader effort supporting Korea's stabilization and structural
adjustment program to restore sustainable high rates of economic growth. It would complement the three-year
stand-by facility provided by the IMF and the emergency financing package from bilateral and multilateral
sources. The project is the first large-scale technical assistance loan to buttress this assistance. An Economic
Reconstruction Loan was approved by the Board on December 23, 1997 in support of the Republic of Korea's
rapid initiation of a program of actions, objectives and policies designed to achieve economic reconstruction
through long-term stabilization of the Korean economy. A Structural Adjustment Loan was approved by the
Board on March 26, 1998 to support a program of wide-ranging and deep reforms aimed at bringing about a
major restructuring of incentives and institutional framework to underpin financial stability, improve
efficiency and competitiveness, and enable Korea to return to a path of robust and sustained growth.
B: Strategic Context
1. Sector-related Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) goals supported by the project (see Annex 1):
CAS document number: N/A Date of latest CAS discussion: Country Strategy Note dated 6/24/93
There is no recent CAS, but a CAS is being initiated at present. The Bank assistance strategy as
outlined in the SAL President's Report dated March 5, 1998, and discussed by the Board of Executive
Directors, identified two main objectives: Restoration of financial stability and resumption of financially
sustainable growth. The Bank would support these objectives by helping define and implement a structural
reform program, through adjustment lending and technical assistance activities. The proposed Financial and
Corporate Restructuring Assistance Loan would support key elements of the structural reform program, thus
helping the implementation of the above SAL as well as the on-going preparation and future implementation
of a SAL II.
The proposed Loan would help:
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(i) avoid major financial instability, mainly through enhanced crisis management capability for the banking
and corporate sectors;
(ii) underpin it by supporting the rehabilitation and recapitalization of banks, as well as the restructuring and
leverage-reduction of corporations; and
(iii) reform incentives and the institutional framework to facilitate financially sustainable growth in the context
of today's integrated and competitive global economy.
2. Main sector issues and Government strategv:
The performance of the Korean economy has been remarkable for the past three decades. The broadly
favorable performance, however, masked weaknesses that contributed to the current crisis. Although
govemnment intervention enabled the economy to grow rapidly over the last decades, it preserved a protected
and inefficient financial sector as well as a highly leveraged and concentrated corporate sector. Weak
corporate govemnance and moral hazard problems have resulted in financial institutions' portfolio problems as
well as funding mismatch and foreign exchange risks.
In the face of mounting financial difficulties in the corporate and financial sectors, the Govemnment
committed itself to wide-ranging structural reforms. The starting point was restructuring and refonn of the
financial sector, but the focus was soon expanded to include the corporate sector as well. Restructuring of
these sectors has been complemented with reforms in their framework, such as corporate governance and
structure; enhanced competition policies; strengthening of the insolvency process; trade and capital account
liberalization; and macroeconomic policies to continue adjusting the current accounts, building up foreign
exchange reserves, containing inflationary pressure through tighter monetary policy and significant fiscal
adjustment. At the same time, the country's new administration is attempting to change widespread patterns of
behavior and orientation that have underpinned the inefficient investment and excessive leveraging of the past.
In sum, the authorities face a challenge of daunting magnitude and complexity: (i) managing a
financial crisis that carries risk of systemic failure not only in the banking but also in the real sector, and that
already entails the economic loss and social consequences of a high number of small and medium enterprise
(SME) bankruptcies; (ii) ensuring the re-capitalization of viable banks and viable large-scale enterprises
which are uniquely over-leveraged; and (iii) addressing underlying paradigms, behaviors, incentives, etc. that
have led to the excessive and inefficiently used debt funding.
The sheer magnitude of the problem creates various difficulties. Leverage-reducing measures such as
tapping the local stock market, attracting foreign strategic investors, or selling domestic assets face absolute
limits in this aggregation. Skills in bank and corporate restructuring are scarce domestically since the
phenomenon had been rare, and international, experts in these areas generally lack first-hand experience in
Korea. Banks need to engage in the drastic restructuring of many large debtors while undergoing drastic
restructuring themselves. Small and medium. enterprises are faltering in masses due to lack of on-going
funding facilities irrespective of their viability., yet the capacity is lacking in the short term to triage and work-
out hundreds of thousands of such firms with any degree of responsible diligence. Financing of state measures
through bonds or privatization proceeds, unless carefully structured and timed, threatens to compete with
corporations' recapitalization efforts in the securities market.
The key elements of Government strategy for a comprehensive restructuring and strengthening of the
financial sector, which remains a centerpiece of the overall reform program, are:
* bank diagnostic studies including review of loan portfolio, trust accounts, and guarantees.
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* bank efforts at loan collection/foreclosure and bank-led loan renegotiation, debt-equity swaps, and other
work-out measures.
* bank recapitalization mainly through asset purchases by the Korea Asset Management Corporation
(KAMC), GOK injection of bonds into banks, and fresh equity from existing and new shareholders.
* many owners/managers forced out of controlling positions; some banks to be closed, or under de facto
conservatorship and offered for sale to new owners; implementation of bank restructuring plans agreed
with and monitored by FSC; and
* improved transparency through better accounting, reporting, minority shareholder rights, etc.;
strengthened prudential regulations and enforcement powers; supervisory authority unified for the entire
financial sector.
Addressing vulnerabilities and rising to the new challenges call for a radical restructuring of the
incentives and institutional framework in the Korean economy. The Government recognizes that the strategy
in the corporate sector requires:
* monitoring of corporate financial crisis in a "war room" mode; managed shift away from "cooperative"
anti-bankruptcy financing; ban on cross-guarantees; initial rough triage; debt so far rolled over for SMEs,
except those identified as non-viable; expansion of credit guarantees for viable SMEs that are cut off from
prior funding sources;
* widespread financial work-outs assisted by financial advisory consortia; for the 5 largest chaebols and for
other chaebol companies by lead banks, especially eight to nine of the largest banks; involves debt and
guarantee restructuring, debt-equity swaps, asset sales, new equity, investment deferral to use the
depreciation shelter, etc.; arbitration committee to get active where creditors fail to agree among
themselves within a short time; backed up by improvements in the framework for bankruptcies and court
administration/mediation;
* unprecedented extent of re-capitalization of corporations through asset sale, new strategic investors, debt-
equity swaps, 'haircuts' of creditors, employee shares, mutual funds, etc.; facilitated by higher
transparency, improved framework for governance, and strengthened securities markets;
v continued business restructuring to focus on core competencies, reduction of excess labor, reconfiguration
of group structures, and efficiency enhancements to compete in an opening economy; and generally a
'cultural change' towards financial results, risk management, transparency, minority shareholders'
interests, and arms' length relationship with government; and
* privatization of state enterprise shares and private participation in new infrastructure projects, with the
short-term objective of raising/saving state funds for bank recapitalization and social protection, and the
longer term objective of removing Government from business.
3. Sector issues to be addressed by the project and strategic choices:
The project would help to address many of the above issues, as described in section C below, through
the provision of technical assistance. It would help to:
* further develop and flexibly adjust the reform strategy in the two sectors,
* build the institutional capacity to implement the program; and
* directly support the implementation of key program elements.
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C: Project Description Summary
L. Project components (see Annex 2for a detai fed description and Annex 3for a detailed cost breakdown):
Component Category Cost Incl. % of Bank- % of
Contingen- Total financing Bank-
cy (US$M) (US$M) financ-
ing
1. Fin. Sector Supervision and Crisis Inst. Building 9.60 17.6% 7.30 76.0%
Management
1.1 FSC Institutional Development
1.2 Fin. Sector Crisis Management Capability
2. Securities Markets Development Ditto 1.95 3.6% 1.44 73.8%
2.1 Market Regulat., Infrastructure, Industry
2.2 Government Bond Markets
2.3 Accounting and Audit Reform
3. Debt Management Improvement Ditto 2.50 4.6% 2.00 80.0%
4. Corporate Restructuring Ditto 32.70 60.0% 30.50 93.3%
5. Corporate Legal/Regulatory Reform Ditto 1.70 3.1% 1.50 88.2%
5.1 Insolvency System
5.2 Governance Framework
6. Competition Policy Ditto 0.61 1.1% 0.42 68.9%
7. Project Implementation Support Ditto 0.22 0.4% 0.20 90.9%
Contingency Ditto 5.22 9.6% 4.64 88.9%
Total 54.50 100.0% 48.00 88.1%
2. Key policy and institutional reforms supported by the project:
The proposed project would support the following key reforms in financial sector:
* institutional strengthening of financial sector supervision for the longer run, including: (i) improvement of
strategies, policies, procedures, and capabilities to adopt and enforce prudential regulations and implement
supervisory practices in line with accepted international practices, and aimed at enhanced coordination of
supervision across the financial sector in a unified institutional setting; and (ii) the implementation of a
new organizational structure of the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), including new operational
policies and human resource development programs;
* strengthening of FSC's capability to manage financial crisis in terms of policies, proced-ures and
implementation capacity, particularly through (i) development of bank evaluation, restructuring and
recapitalization processes; and (ii) implementation mechanisms for the above;
* enhancing the development of securities imarkets, through (i) reform of the regulatory framework towards
stronger self-regulation, rationalization of the market architecture, and redefining the securities industry
aimed at higher levels of innovation and competitiveness; (ii) strengthening of Government bond markets,
particularly primary and secondary markets; and (iii) reform in the areas of accounting and audit; and
* improving the soundness of Government debt management, through strengthened professional capability,
information systems, and organizational arrangements.
Timely and adequate restructuring of financially distressed/insolvent corporations is promoted
concerning corporate restructuring, in particular towards lower debt-equity ratios and higher interest coverage,
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in ways that would minimize strains on the court system and generate rapid trickle-down benefits for SMEs.
This would be addressed by:
* vastly enhancing the capacity of the main commercial banks to work out large corporate borrowers; and
* in the process, building sustained institutional capacity for corporate restructuring in these banks, their
inter-creditor arbitration committee, and a number of enterprises subject to restructuring.
The strengthening of corporate governance is critical for sustaining the results of financial and
corporate sector restructuring. Corporate governance would be enhanced specifically through:
* establishment of a more reliable corporate insolvency system that ensures a balance of stakeholder
interests;
* development of credible mechanisms to encourage the monitoring of corporate performance by various
stakeholders (directors, shareholders, creditors, regulators, media); and
* increased effectiveness of competition policy, in particular the application of the Fair Trade Act.
3. Benefits and target population:
The project is a strategic follow-up to Bank assistance to the Government following the recent
financial and foreign exchange crisis. This project will: (i) reduce the likelihood of systemic failure in the
financial as well as corporate sectors; (ii) make the recapitalization of the banking system as well as the
corporate sector more rapid, effective, and economically efficient than it would be without the assistance
program; and (iii) deepen a process of change towards, inter alia, better enterprise transparency and
governance, a focus on financial results rather than operational size, and less Government involvement in
business.
The target beneficiaries in a wide sense would be investors, employees, and consumers of Korean
corporations and banks. Direct beneficiaries will include implementing institutions that would be strengthened
institutionally (such as FSC and KFTC), as well as several commercial entities (eight main commercial banks,
and some 6-12 very large corporations undergoing particularly in-depth restructuring by these lead banks).
4. Institutional and implementation arrangements:
The implementation period of the Loan would cover a period of about three years, and complement
the adjustment lending provided by the Bank and help generate sustained institutional change.
The executing agencies under the project would be the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE)
and Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC). A Project Implementation Unit (PIU) will be established at
MOFE to help manage components 2, 3, 5 and 6 of the project and ensure coordination of the different project
components. This PIU will be formed within the Treasury Division of MOFE. It will be directed by the
Director of the Treasury Division. A senior staff from the Treasury Division would act on a part-time basis as
Deputy Director with powers to hire and request disbursements from the Bank. This PIU would, inter alia,
manage a special account, carry out accounting, engage independent auditors, prepare and send disbursement
requests to the Bank, advise the various technical implementing agencies in procurement matters consistent
with Bank guidelines, and compile quarterly and mid-term project progress reports.
A second PIU has been established at FSC to help manage components I and 4 of the project. This
PIU has been formed within the Planning and Administration Department of FSC. It is directed by the
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Director General of this Department. A senior staff from the Department will act on a part-time basis as
Deputy Director with powers to hire and request disbursements from the Bank. The functions of this PIU will
be the same as those described above for the PIU at MOFE, including the management of a second special
account.
Under the overall coordination of MOFE, several implementation agencies would be the focus of the
project activities, including the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), Ministry of Justice (MOJ), Korean
Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), and MOFE itself. These agencies would be responsible for carrying out their
respective project components. These agencies would carry out procurement, contract the consultants, and
manage them. They would also carry out the few, minor cases of procurement of goods.
A Project Steering Committee comprising representatives of these agency representatives would
convene regularly under the chairmanship of the Director of MOFE's Treasury Division to coordinate Project
implementation activities and monitor progress. On the Bank's side, supervision would be carried out by the
East Asia & Pacific Region's Private Sector Development Unit in coordination with the Country Management
Unit based in Seoul and more specialized staff in units at headquarters.
The various components of the proposed project must be carried out according to terms of reference
acceptable to the Bank. Any training, stud;y tours and workshops under this project would be carried out
according to programs and timetables acceptable to the Bank. Terms of reference for the key project phases
were agreed upon during negotiations. Detailed implementation plans for each component would be regularly
updated and submitted to the Bank for approval during project implementation.
Accounting, Reporting, and Auditing. The project accounts and financial reporting would be done in
accordance with standards acceptable to the Bank. The two PIUs would be responsible for keeping financial
records and expenditures incurred for different components of the Project, as well as monthly financial
management reports. The two PlUs would also prepare quarterly project progress reports, and each
implementing agency would be responsible for preparing inputs to these reports. Project management teams
in MOFE and FSC including a qualified accountant based in MOFE and another in FSC, would keep track of
all financial transactions and be responsible for producing project accounts. Project accounts including
Statements of Expenditures and Special Accounts would be audited annually by the independent auditors
acceptable to the Bank. Copies of annual financial statements, audited reports (including Special Accounts
and Statements of Expenditures audit opinions) would be submitted to the Bank within six months of the end
of the fiscal year. Based on the Guide for Review and Design of Accounting and Reporting Systems prepared
by the Bank's East Asia and Pacific Region, the control environment of implementing agencies is being
assessed, and an appropriate accounting and reporting system developed according to the requirements of
OP/BP 10.02. The system, including progress and financial reporting, will be prepared and is expected to be
ready for implementation by the time of project effectiveness. Qualified accountants will be designated or
recruited to prepare and manage the financial management aspects of the Project.
Monitoring of project execution will be undertaken by the PIUs which will submit to the Bank for its
approval initially quarterly project progress reports within one month after the end of each quarter year,
starting with a first report by 10/1999. After the first year of the Project, semi-annual project progress reports
will be submitted within one month after the end of each half year. The quarterly and semi-annual reports
would include (a) a retrospective assessment in meeting agreed outputs, and (b) working plans for the
following six months. A mid-term review of the project will be submitted by the PIUs to the Bank by
November 30, 1999 to assess progress in project implementation and to set out measures recommended to
ensure the efficient carrying out of the project and achieving the project objectives.
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D: Project Rationale
1. Project alternatives considered and reasons for rejection:
The Government has demonstrated its commitment to taking the measures needed to stabilize the
economy and the financial sector. At the same time, the Government recognizes that major institutional and
structural weaknesses need to be remedied to sustain that stability. The proposed project aims to assist the
Govemment in these endeavors in specific areas as requested by the Government. An important principle in
developing the Project was to respond quickly and constructively to a set of priority needs. The proposed
assistance would enhance the technical capability of the Government for effective management of the
problems in the financial and corporate sectors, and for sustained and stable growth in the increasingly
integrated and competitive global economy.
The first altemative considered was non-lending service, with reimbursement by the Government, to
help prepare and supervise various consultants engagements which would be funded by the Government
without a Bank Loan. It has been rejected, however, taking into consideration that the client's leadership seeks
a more direct, visible role of the Bank in the provision of consultancy so as to convince lower levels of
bureaucracy of the benefits of consultant services, and to ensure proper incentives for the Bank to consistently
ensure their effective use. Moreover, the Govemment finds the Bank's Loan terms advantageous compared to
alternative sources at this point in time.
Several smaller TA loans were also considered, with a view to facilitating their management. This
alternative was rejected for several reasons: Parliamentary approval for several operations would be more
difficult than for one; the main components of the proposed loan are closely linked; all main components are
needed urgently at the same time; and total costs for the Bank would be higher. Social security reform,
however, would be addressed under the ASEM grant and potentially other grants, because its inclusion would
make the proposed Loan excessively complex in scope, counterparts and expertise.
2. Major related projects financed by the Bank and/or other development agencies (completed, ongoing and
planned):
Latest Supervision (Form 590) Ratings
Sector Issue Project (Bank-financed projects only)
Implementation Development
Progress (IP) Objective (DO)
Bank-Financed
Structural Reform in Fin. and Corp. Sectors SAL I (3/98)
Deepening of Structural Reforms SAL 11 (planned)
Banking Sector Reform Strategy Advice by SFOU (NLS)
Credit Line for Real Sectors Financial Intermediation Project S S
(ongoing since 1994)
Other Development Agencies
Stabilization and Structural Reform IMF Standby
Asset Resolution (KAMC), Asset ADB: Financial Sector Restructuring
Securitization, Banking Supervision and Development Assistance Project
Bank Strengthening (Korea Long-Term IFC (since 1968/71); 6/98 approval of
Credit Bank; Hana Bank) and Provision of equity, convertible bonds and credit for
Working Capital Hana Bank, and convertible bonds for
KLTCB
Potentially: Establishment of Private Equity IFC (identification)
Fund(s)
IP/DO Ratings: HS (Highly Satisfactory), S (Satisfactory), U (Unsatisfactory), HU (Highly Unsatisfactory)
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The Project would be complemented by several Bank-administered grants:
(i) A Special PHRD grant of US$1.45 million is supporting some urgent actions of financial sector reform
including, inter alia, legal counsel required in the course of bank diagnostic studies.
(ii) A second Special PHRD grant of about: US$1.35 million is expected to aim at corporate restructuring. It
would finance some corollary activities to the Project's corporate restructuring component such as the
development of strategies and programs for SME restructuring, special studies on longer-termt strategies
to improve the capitalization of large enterprises; and the design and start-up of a monitoring and analysis
system for the reform of administrative regulations affecting business.
(iii) ASEM grant funding is expected to help strengthen the capacity of the social protection system and labor
market institutions to respond to rapidly rising unemployment.
The Korea Asset Management Corporation, which is playing an important role in carving out and
disposing of bank assets, is being supported by the Asian Development Bank. The Asian Development Bank
has notionally allocated a third of its USS15 million Technical Assistance program to this support, but is
prepared to raise this share if and when the need arises.
3. Lessons learned and reflected in the project design:
Situations of economic stress call for assistance to be timely and flexible. Complex technical
assistance loans, however, are hard to implement in a rapid manner. Project design has sought to adclress these
lessons by limiting the number of direct clients to four; electing one central implementation unit to assist
procurement and handle disbursement; focusing on few large components with large-size contracts; referring
to grant funding some small components that had been proposed for the Project; delegating responsibility for
supervision of major components to SFOU and PSD; and ensuring sufficient supervision budget.
The restructuring of the banking sector and corporate sector must be closely coordinated if problems
are widespread in both. Creditors to be sound need sound borrowers, and borrowers to become sound need the
pressure and cooperation of strong creditors.
Poor governance in banks and corporations contributed critically to the economic crisis. The proposed
project would address governance through components for accounting, bankruptcy system, legal framework
for governance, competition policy and securities markets, and by encouraging profound restructuring that
involves changes in ownership, management, etc.
4. Indications of borrower commitment and ownership:
The Government has urged the Bank to prepare the proposed Project within a very short time frame.
The Government is convinced that prompt action towards fundamental structural adjustment is required to
rebuild investor confidence, limit wider adverse repercussions of the financial crisis, and return the economy to
sustained strong and stable growth. Strong commitment to the Project has been expressed particularly by
high-level officials in the key client agencies, including the President's Office and FSC; the latter would
receive the largest part of the Loan proceeds.
5. Value added of Bank support in this project:
The extensive use of advisory tearns with international experience is practically indispensable, in
Korea as elsewhere, in areas such as the diagnostic or restructuring of large corporates and banks.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the restructuring task in the banking and corporate sectors is extraordinary, and
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local experience in these areas has developed only to limited extent in the formerly fast-growing economy. As
a result, the local capacity to handle the challenge is insufficient unless supplemented by large amounts of
external advisory services. Moreover, the consultants would be catalysts for fundamental change in the
objectives/mission, orientation, policies, practices, skills mix, etc. of the recipient institutions. Bank
involvement in preparation and supervision would help ensure the effective and efficient use of such advisory
teams. The Project would also enhance the opportunities for the Bank to bring its best practice expertise to
bear in discussions on Korea's crisis resolution and structural reform policy. Moreover, the Bank's
involvement would help send a confidence-building signal to markets/investors. Finally, the Loan would help
relieve the stress that bank recapitalization, social protection, and other crisis-related measures will put on
Government finances.
E: Summary Project Analysis
1. Economic:
Not applicable.
2. Financial:
The project is expected to yield significant returns by augmenting the Korean Government's efforts to
(i) achieve macro economic stabilization of the economy; (ii) comprehensively strengthen the financial sector,
as well as its prudential regulations and their enforcement; (iii) improve corporate governance and financial
transparency; and (iv) enhance the resiliency and international competitiveness of Korea's industrial sector.
Fiscal impact:
The Project is expected to assist in minimizing the fiscal impact and increasing the fiscal revenue base
by (i) reducing the risk of wide uncontrolled failure in the banking sector; (ii) strengthening the Government's
ability to anticipate corporate defaults and to facilitate timely, market-based responses by financial institutions,
and developing procedures and institutions to support timely conclusion of complex voluntary workouts; (iii)
limiting state funds required for bank recapitalization; and (iv) accelerating the withdrawal of Government
from business.
3. Technical:
The Project will ensure that the Korean Government obtains access to high quality expertise and
international best practice available from international consultants and training opportunities.
4. Institutional:
a. Executing agencies:
The Project aims to improve the capability of key economic agencies (Ministry of Finance and
Economy, Financial Supervisory Commission, Korean Fair Trade Commission) and other related
implementation agencies, particularly the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), to formulate and implement polices to
deal with economic crisis and strengthen the regulatory environment for sustained and stable growth.
b. Project management:
The Project will be coordinated by forming an inter-agency Project Steering Committee. Project
implementation capacity will be deepened particularly at MOFE and FSC.
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5. Social:
Not applicable
6. Environmental assessment: Environmental Category []A []B [x] C
No major environmental issues are expected to accrue from implementing the Project. Loan funds
would not be available to real-sector enterprises. The corporate restructuring, for which the Project would
fund financial advisory teams, may occasionally have an influence on environmental issues, mainly where
restructuring involves closure of facilities, bankruptcy of their operators, or enterprise sale. Accordingly,
terms of reference of financial advisory consortia would require that potentially substantial environrmental
liabilities be taken into account in cases of enterprise closures, bankruptcies and sale in the light of an early
review of the relevant legal and regulatory framework.
7. Participatory approach:
a Primary beneficiaries and other affected groups:
Consultations were held with a wide range of stakeholders, including representatives from relevant
government agencies including MOFE, FSC, MOJ, and KFTC, financial institutions, corporations and non-
government organizations, e.g., KICPA and the Korean Securities Research Institute.
b. Other key stakeholders:
Discussions were held with the Federation of Korean Industries, the Bankers Association, and various
research institutions. The interlocutors gave their views and recommendations on restructuring needs in the
financial and corporate sectors, constraints to such restructuring and actions to remove them, and the potential
role of various parties in the process.
F: Sustainability and Risks
1. Sustainability:
Sustainability of project outputs would come from the learning experience under the project. This
experience would help to expand and continue the initially Bank-funded restructuring actions to additional
banks and corporations.
Sustainability of project outcomes would depend largely on the nature and scope of the crisis
resolution measures. A future repeat of bank recapitalization should be avoided by assessing banks' financial
condition realistically, limiting moral hazard through burden-sharing with bank owners, managers and
creditors, and changing the culture of lending and risk-taking. A future repeat of sweeping corporate
restructuring should be avoided by making the present restructuring sufficiently deep (beyond mere financial
rearrangements), paradigm-changing for the stakeholders, and confidence-inspiring for new investors.
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Sustainability of project impact is enhanced by addressing long-tenn strategic and institutional issues
in addition to shorter term crisis resolution: capacity building for bank supervision in addition to banking
crisis management; improvements in the governance framework in addition to corporate restructuring; and
strengthening of securities markets.
2. Critical Risks (reflecting assumptions in the fourth column ofAnnex 1):
Risk Risk Risk Minimization Measure
Rating
Annex 1, cell "from Outputs to Objective"
External events may drastically affect Korea's prospects for S Crisis management assistance under the Project,
crisis prevention/resolution and financial recovery. as well as intensive Project supervision and
related NLS, to help early identification and
rapid response to external shocks.
Government, formed by a coalition without parliamentary H Assurances of leadership's commitment to
majority, may face difficulties implementing reforms with profound reform, especially in context of SAL I
appropriate consistency and resolve. and to be sought under SAL II.
Organized labor may hinder real sector restructuring in the H Restructuring to involve visible burden-sharing of
depth and time-frame required and, in the process, weaken owners and managers, as per tripartite agreement
the recovery of investor confidence. in early 1998; Bank assistance and its outcomes to
inspire investor confidence.
The banks who are to lead corp. restructuring will S Consultant teams for lead banks contracted by
themselves at the same time be subject to drastic FSC.
restructuring, including merger with, or assumption by,
other banks. This may affect their incentives, focus, and
implementation capacity in corporate restructuring.
Changes of institutional culture in Government and S The country's leadership unambiguously pursues
business towards more transparency and less Government these changes as a fundamental for sustained
intervention may face resistance, and may affect the timely growth in today's global economy.
and effective use of the advisory services.
Annex 1, cell "from Components to Outputs"
Parliamentary discussions or Governmental budget and S Staff communication with representatives of
administrative procedures may cause delay in effectiveness, relevant parliamentary commission(s), and recent
and delay even of Project actions that would be eligible for assertion of high-level authorities' commitment to
retroactive financing. accelerated processing.
Clients' implementation capacity is constrained by crisis S Main project components to strengthen the core of
management workload, repeated restructuring and the Government's crisis resolution and
multiplicity of institutions, and shortage of prior experience restructuring capacity.
in key areas like financial restructuring.
Consultant procurement procedures may cause critical S Possibility of sole-sourcing and shortened bidding
delays in start-up of crisis-resolution activities. periods of selected contracts, on an exceptional
basis.
Project supervision budget of IBRD may not be sustained in M FY99 supervision budget about $350,000, mostly
adequate volume through peak implementation period. from the Special Financial Operation's budget.
Overall Risk Rating H
Risk Rating - H (High Risk), S (Substantial Risk), M (Modest Risk), N (Negligible or Low Risk)
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3. Possible Controversial Aspects:
None.
G: Main Loan Conditions
1. Effectiveness Conditions:
Effectiveness Conditions of the Loan are: (i) to establish, and assign adequate numbers of staff to, the
Project Implementation Units (PIUs) (see C.4); and (ii) to establish and appoint members of a Project Steering
Committee (see C.4).
2. Other:
Key Covenants of the Loan are: (i) open and maintain two Special Accounts in US dollars at
commercial banks acceptable to the Bank on terms and conditions satisfactory to the Bank; (ii) carry out
annual audits of the consolidated project accounts, Special Account, and statements of expenditures and
submit audit reports to the Bank not later than four months after the end of each fiscal year; (iii) submit
quarterly project reports and draft work plams, starting end-September 1998 for one year, and semi-annual
project reports and work plans thereafter; (:iv) assess progress in project implementation pursuant to agreed
Performance Indicators; (v) carry out a mid-term project implementation review by September 30, 1999 and a
Project implementation completion review within six months after Project completion (see C.4); (vi) undertake
project activities in accordance with terms of reference and implementation timetables agreed with the Bank;
(vii) carry out training activities in accordance with programs and timetables acceptable to the Bank; (viii)
carry out studies in accordance with terms of reference and a schedule satisfactory to the Bank; (ix) procure
equipment in conformity with applicable Bank guidelines; (x) maintain the PIUs and Steering Committee until
Project completion; (xi) ensure the conduct of a review of the regulatory framework with respect to
environmental impact, including potential environmental liabilities, associated with enterprise closure,
bankruptcy, or sale, and ensure that advisors on corporate restructuring take into account such impact and
potential liabilities in the light of this framework; (xii) establish appropriate steering committees for the
coordination of the Project sub-components regarding insolvency and corporate governance; (xiii) enter into a
collaboration arrangement with KICPA regarding the Project sub-components on accounting/audit reform.
H. Readiness for Implementation
[ ] The engineering design documents for the first year's activities are complete and ready for the start of
project implementation. [x] Not applicable.
[x] The procurement documents for the firsi: year's activities are substantially complete and ready for the start
of project implementation.
[x] The Project Implementation Plan has been appraised and found to be realistic and of satisfactory quality.
[ The following items are lacking and are cliscussed under loan conditions (Section G):
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I. Compliance with Bank Policies
[x] This project complies with all applicable Bank policies.
Task Team Leader: Klaus Lorch
Sector Manager: Hoon Mok Chung
Country Director: M.G. Sri-Ram Aiyer
Page 15 ANNEX 1
ANNEX 1: PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY
Narrative Summary Key Performance Indicators Monitoring and Evaluation Critical Assumptions
Sector-related Strategy Goal: (Goal to Bank Mission)
* Short-term: Reduced likelihood of systemic failure in the * No generalized collapse of banking and large-scale * Judgment by Steering Committee and Bank * No major extemal shocks
banking and corporate sectors enterprise sectors regional management
* Medium-term: Improved capitalization and structure in * Debt-equity ratio of banks and chaebols substantially * Data compiled from GOK and research * Macroeconomic policies
financial and corporate sectors improved institutions conducive to strengthening the
* Long-term: Widespread change in corporate govemance and * Improved transparency, enhanced focus on financial * Dialogue with various stakeholders, fin. structure of banks and firms
transparency, corporate mission, and govemment-business results, and reduced Govemment role in business reported including academics, local businessmen, * No broad withdrawal from
relations by market participants foreign investors, etc. change in reaction to social
hardship and global
market/investor influence
Project Development Objective: (Objective to Goal)
* Short-term: Adequate action plans for financial and corporate * Adequate quality and timeliness of action plans, and * Judgment by task team, confirmed by * Governing coalition not paralyzed
sector adopted and implemented largely consistent implementation compliance with respective SAL conditions, by internal dispute or by militant
and agreement on SAL 11 action program labor actions
* Medium-term: Debt-equity ratio of commercial banks and * Commercial banks meeting BIS capital adequacy, or * Banks: financial statements confirmed by * No major external shock and no
corporations substantially improved being under external supervision or closed; debt-equity international standard audits. Corporates: severe internal labor strive
ratio of large-scale, non-financial chaebol corporations GOK-compiled data on chaebol financial
substantially reduced structure
* Long-term: Significant changes in practices and orientation * Role of SROs (KICPA, securities markets) strengthened; * Review of policies, procedures, etc.
among agency and lead bank staffworking directly with the FSC/lead banks actively seeking foreign capital in emerging from and being applied under the
advisory teams or participating in extended training working out banks/debtors; expanded mandated Project
disclosure to minority shareholders
Outputs: (Outputs to Objective)
* Short-term: Strengthened action plans and * Revised, detailed action plans; monitoring systems * Project supervision in field; action plans
implementation/monitoring capacity for banking sectors established; advisors integrated into "war room" submitted and reviewed
crisis management operational activities
* Medium-term: Viable commercial banks being restructured * Banking: Large-scale commercial banking sector * Regular project supervision * Lead banks pursue work-out of
under FSC's purview; large chaebol corporations worked out undergoing substantial restructuring. Corporate sector: major debtors with sufficient
by lead banks; non-viable banks/firms closed/liquidated or At least 16 inter-linked business groups worked out with resolve and actively involve the
merged substantial assistance of project-funded advisors advisors
* Long-term: Transmission of international best practice in * Consultancies utilized to the extent foreseen under the * Regular project supervision * Counterpart staff remain open-
policies, practices, institutional arrangements, etc. project and largely staffed with experts with extensive minded to learning from
international experience intemational best practices
Project (Sub-)Components: (see Annex 2 for project Inputs: (budget for each component) (Components to Outputs)
description)
* Short-term: * Part of * Regular project supervision * FSC engages external consultants
(i) banking crisis management capacity (i) $5.0 million of the nature, extent, and
* Medium-term: * Parts of * Regular project supervision functions agreed
(i) FSC institutional development (i) $4.6 million
(ii) Corporate restructurir,g (ii) $32.7 million
(iii) corporate govemance and securities markets (iii) $3.0 million
* Long-term: Generally all project components. Emphasis in: * In particular: * Regular project supervision
(i) corporate govemance/insolvency (1) $1.7 million
(ii) competition policy (ii) $0.6 million
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ANNEX 2: PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Project Component 1: Financial Sector Supervision and Crisis Management - US$9.6 million
(of which Loan: US$7.3 million)
1.1 FSC Institutional Strengthening in Financial Sector Supervision (US$4.6 million)
Legislation passed on December 29, 1997 established the basis for a new financial supervisory system
in Korea. A first step was the establishment of the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) on April 1,
1998, as an integrated financial supervision authority. Under the new system, all financial institutions
(banking, securities, insurance and other non-bank institutions) are supervised by a single supervisory body,
the FSC and its executive arm, the Financial Supervisory Board (FSB). The Chairman, Deputy Chairman and
the Standing Commissioner are appointed by the Korean President. The reform calls for all four supervisory
agencies (Banking Supervision Authority, Securities Supervision Board, Insurance Supervisory Board, and
Non-Bank Financial Institution Supervisory Authority ) to be fully integrated into the FSB by January 1, 1999.
It is expected that this integration of the supervisory function of all financial institutions will lead to
harmonization and consistency in supervisory standards and practice and the regulatory framework, and lay
the groundwork for enhanced competition among different types of financial service providers. Institutional
strengthening of the supervisory function will improve government's official oversight of the financial system,
enhancing systemic soundness. The proposed technical assistance will assist in achieving these objectives.
(Considering the urgent need of the FSC to further develop and implement an overall strategy for financial
crisis resolution, the proposed Project would through another sub-component also help strengthen FSC's crisis
management capability.)
This institution-building would address:
(i) Development of FSC's strategies, policies, procedures and capabilities to adopt and enforce prudential
regulations and implement supervisory practices in line with accepted international practices.
An analysis will be made of the differences between present Korean practices and international
practices in prudential supervision. A strategy for prioritizing and implementing indicated improvements will
follow from this evaluation. Assistance will focus on the following areas:
* General On-site Supervision and Inspections Process. FSC will recruit expertise to develop effective
inspection policies and procedures, including consolidated supervision, in line with internationally
acceptable norms. These policies and procedures will be institutionalized in a set of comprehensive
inspection procedures manuals, and reinforced through on-the-job and classroom training programs.
* Specialized Technical Expertise in On-Site Supervision and Inspection. The Project would provide
required expertise in new and complex fields such as derivatives, asset-backed securities, and investment
banking. This would be achieved by the development and implementation of a permanent training
program for staff including on-the-job training (with the assistance of seconded foreign experts) and
training of supervisors abroad.
* Financial Analysis Capability and Off-Site Supervision. The Project would support improvements in
technical analysis capabilities, the integration of financial analysis into the supervision process (on-site
and off-site), and the development of indicators of financial group solvency and financial distress which
would be reported to and monitored by FSC management.
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* Review of Regulatory Reports and Regulatory Accounting Principles. The objective of this sub-
component will be to upgrade the quality of data requested from individual financial institutions and
groups. The current capacity of processing systems will be reviewed and upgraded so as to ensure
integrity of data. The regulatory and output reports may also need to be redesigned so as to focus on the
assessment of the financial risks undertakcen by the financial institutions.
(ii) The implementation of FSC 's new organizational structure, including the design and initial implementation
of a human resource development program.
* Implementation of FSC's new organizational structure. Following the recommendations elaborated by an
FSC Task force on Supervisory Organization Innovation with support by McKinsey consultants, the
Project will assist in the implementation of the new FSC. This will include consultants to help develop
FSC's internal information and communications systems, and to help formulate human resource policies
and training programs to start up their operation.
* Human Resource Development. This component will introduce enhanced policies regarding human
resource development at FSC. This will include the design and implementation of training programs to
ensure adequate skills of supervisors, the development of mechanisms for ensuring the adequacy of FSC's
staff skill mix and of standards for hiring new employees, the maintenance of adequate job descriptions,
the definition of career development paiths, and the elaboration of supporting compensation policies and
systems. The implementation of training is expected to include the provision of a regular education
program in bank supervision skills by a local training institution with help of trainers with broad
international experience.
The core of the services and assistance would be provided by experts that have successfully
participated in the financial crisis resolution of other countries and similar structural reforms in recent years.
Some of the experts are expected to be seconded by foreign supervisory agencies.
Timing: 9/1998-12/2000 (28 months)
1.2 Financial Sector Crisis Management Capability (US$5.0 million)
While the newly established FSC builds its capacity for general financial supervision, it also needs to
urgently strengthen its capability to respond 1o financial institution crisis. The FSC is charged with developing
and implementing an overall strategy for financial crisis resolution. This is an immediately urgent task which
is presently absorbing most of FSC's attention. To carry out this immediate task, a special unit (Structural
Reform Planning Unit) has been established within FSC, reporting directly to the FSC Chairman and staffed in
part with experts seconded by other agencies and Korean research institutions. The FSC will require
substantial consultant support to operationalize strategies for the restructuring of banks. and non-bank financial
institutions.
The technical assistance would help develop strategies and processes, design an organizational
structure, and introduce staff capabilities to effectively manage crisis among financial institutions. There
would be two elements:
* Support to the Strengthening of the Financial Institutions Crisis Resolution Strategy and its
Implementation. Expertise will be provided to FSC's Financial Reform Planning Unit to assist FSC's
senior management in further refining the overall strategy for sound management of financial crisis. This
will include the development of principles, processes, analytical tools, and operational capabilities to
refine resolution strategies. The consultEmts will also advise on the implementation of crisis resolution and
structural reform measures in the financial sector.
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* Development of Methodologies and Generation of Data for Financial Institution Resolution Strategies.
Consultants will help develop methodologies to design, evaluate, and implement alternative financial
institution resolution strategies that aim at building a sound financial sector structure. Consultants would
also help generate data on financial institutions from within and outside these financial institutions, as
inputs into the decisions on financial sector crisis management and structural reform. In particular,
consultants will advise FSC on the assessment of financial institution rehabilitation plans.
Most of the assistance would be provided by individual experts and consultant firms that have
successfully participated in the crisis resolution and bank restructuring in the financial sector of other countries
in recent years.
Timing: 7/1998-9/1999 (15 months)
Project Component 2: Securities Markets Development - US$1.95 million
(of which Loan: US$1.44 million)
2.1 Securities Markets Regulation, Infrastructure, and Industry (US$0.7 million)
The recent financial crisis has revealed a number of issues in Korea's financial and corporate sectors
which have profound implications about both urgent and medium-term needs to develop the capital markets.
First, Korea's corporate financing pattern needs to diversify away from the excessive reliance on short-term
bank borrowing to market-based long-term financing particularly through the equity market to avoid excessive
leveraging. This includes a likely need to convert a significant amount of the existing corporate debt into
equity. It would unlikely be achieved only by attracting foreign investment but require deep and efficient
domestic capital markets. Therefore, Korea's capital markets need to become a truly attractive and
competitive place to raise, invest and trade capital, and securities intermediaries and institutional investors
must be sound and competitive. Market institutions such as the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) must become
not only operationally effective but also cost competitive. The functional role sharing among the market
institutions warrants rationalization, and gray areas due to introduction of new financial instruments such as
interest rate derivatives need to be clarified. These would require fundamental review of policies for
intermarket competition and overall market architecture. Work in this area would require close coordination
with work on trading market for government bonds.
Secondly, in order for Korea's financial institutions to enhance their risk-sensitivity and encourage
sound financing practice of their client corporations, they will be given greater self-responsibility to manage
their own business risks. This would also require tightening up prudential regulation as a "stick." The recent
extensive liberalization of the country's capital account also means that much of the necessary risk
management now needs to be done by the private sector themselves. Thus, the framework of Korea's financial
market regulation needs to vertically delegate greater regulatory responsibilities to private hands. This would
complete the reform of the institutional framework of regulation by supplementing the on-going horizontal
integration of the government regulators. Greater emphasis on self-regulation is inseparable from redefining
Korea's market architecture and structure of the market institutions as mentioned in the above paragraph, since
organized trading markets and clearing and settlement institutions play and are expected to play the role of
self-regulatory organization (SRO). Currently, KSE and Korea Securities Dealers' Association (KSDA) have
legally recognized SRO status.
Thirdly, lack of transparency and effective governance of Korean corporations failed to bring market
discipline to their financing practice. Other components of this Project will address accounting and disclosure
standards and rules for corporate actions. Such rules and standards must, however, be accompanied by an
effective mechanism of delivering them. This is to be achieved through the systems and business procedures
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of the securities market according to the regulations stipulated and enforced by the securities regulator. The
recently instituted company-form mutual funds with regulations to address potential agency problems will be a
useful vehicle to ensure transparent and independent relationships among the funds, their management
companies and the invested companies while also useful in supporting the corporate restructuring. The other
existing institutional investors must also be strengthened to mobilize savings and to be more active as owners
to ensure financial discipline of the invested corporations.
To carry out policy actions agreed to under the SAL, a Taskforce on the Advancement of Capital
Markets was created upon MOFE's initiative. The reform efforts of this Taskforce in selected critical areas of
the securities market and industry will be assisted through MOFE:
* reform of the regulatory framework of the securities market with a greater emphasis on self-regulation and
prudential regulation including strengthening of risk management capacity of securities firms and
institutional investors; and
* rationalization of the market architectuire and the ownership, governance and functions of the market
institutions in order to enhance efficiency, safety, transparency and competitiveness of the market places.
A primary focus will be placed on assisting efforts by the Taskforce on Advancement of the Securities
Market, or successor hereto, to draft reform proposals in the above areas and subsequently support
implementation of the proposals. The assistance will include financing of detailed review and comments on
the reform proposals by consultants; overseas study tours of Taskforce members; the organization of
international seminars/ workshops; the acquisition of research materials; and studies of systems and practices
of foreign markets by consultants (with extensive relevant work experience in securities markets of several
foreign countries) working with the Taskforce.
The main outputs of this sub-component would include:
(i) Reform of the regulatory framework:
* defining the role of SROs and their member firms, and rules for granting a SRO status; drafting of a model
code of conduct for the securities industry and rules for its enforcement; recommendations for regulatory
and supervisory role sharing and mandatory cooperation among FSC/SSB, SROs and their member firms,
including differentiation of rules for going public and those for listing; and recommendations for
information technology capacity building required for effective cooperation, strengthening of systems and
institutions for training and licensing of securities industry professionals such as brokers, fund managers,
securities analysts and derivative special ists;
* defining consolidated prudential regulations for a securities firm as part of a financial conglomerate,
supervision of compliance with prudentilal regulation including manuals for auditing of risk management
capacity of market intermediaries, development of a model middle office system for automated accounting
and risk management for the securities industry to monitor, report and manage consolidated net capital
positions, model professional licensing system; and
* recommendations for steps to introduce the mark-to-market accounting requirement for intermediaries and
institutional investors and securities lending, borrowing and short-selling, including tax policy for gains
and losses through mark-to-market ancl transactions of securities lending, borrowing and short-selling
(Note that this part needs to be coordinated closely with recommendations under the Subcomponent on
Bond Market Development.).
(ii) Rationalization of the market architecture:
* policy recommendations for intermarket competition including, concentration of order flows, trading of
non-listed securities and listed companies outside the KSE and/or KOSDAQ, trading rules/algorithms
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(order-driven versus quote-driven, etc.), policy for proprietary trading systems, and definition of and
licensing for an organized trading market (Note that Market Infrastructure of the Subcomponent on Bond
Market Development will be a key component of this outcome.);
* recommendations for rationalizing functional role of organized trading markets (KSE, KSDA, etc.), the
clearing and settlement organization, the governance / ownership of those market institutions, and for
revision of relevant laws, regulations and by-laws (e.g., realignment of location of the settlement
guarantee fund, concentration of client accounts in an integrated depository/registrar, policies for
separation of the futures market and the stock exchange, etc.); and
* recommendations for clarifying policies regarding licensing/authorization of organized market places,
legal definition of an "organized trading market", policy for proprietary trading systems and inter-market
competition.
(iii) Study of the demand on bond markets:
* In-depth diagnosis of the demand side of bond markets in Korea, looking in detail at existing legal,
regulatory, and institutional obstacles to the extensive use of key institutional demand vehicles such as
mutual funds, life insurance, and pension funds. The study would also quantify the current and potential
demand for bonds. Moreover, it would address tax issues at the individual and institutional level, as well
as specific considerations related to the competitiveness of securities taxation for international investors.
Finally, policy recommendations will be elaborated for high-level policy-makers particularly in the
President's Office, MOFE, and FSC, addressing the above identified barriers to bond market demand as
well as supporting policies for bond market development.
Timing: 9/1998-12/1999 (15 months)
2.2 Development of Government Bond Markets (US$0.7 million)
Bond markets in Korea are comparatively less well developed than in many other industrialized
countries. A well developing bond market would be important for capital market development in general, help
diversify investor risk, and provide enterprises with non-bank financing. The basic non-risk government
Treasury market is underdeveloped, to the extent that the market does not have a well-shaped yield curve.
The overall objective would be an efficient and self-sufficient bond market in Korea. To this end two
sets of activities may overlap in time: (i) A primary program aimed at ensuring a sound basic framework,
which should be built on a strong demand for bonds and a major sound issuer; and (ii) a consolidation
program focused on improving market efficiency and providing a stimulating environment for innovation.
The diagnosis of demand for bonds has been included in the above sub-component 2.1 since it will, like the
other elements of sub-component 2. 1, involve the Taskforce on the Advancement of Capital Markets and the
Korea Securities Research Institute as the main parties working directly with the consultants.
The main outputs of sub-component 2.2 would be:
(i) Government bond management policy:
* Study and recommendations regarding the role of active Government bond management policy. Among
other things, the study will look into the implications of increased public spending for Government bond
market development, and the efficiency of Government bond management including redemption.
(ii) Efficiency improvements in primary and secondary markets for Government bonds:
Consultant advice and workshops would address selected measures to transform the Government bond
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market into a liquid and transparent market in a short period of time. This will include in particular the
primary and secondary markets as indicated below. To lesser extent, it will address the infrastructure of the
derivatives and over-the-counter markets.
* Strengthening of the primary market for Government securities through improvement in the organization
of government auctions and the use of buy-backs and substitution schedules to strengthen more fungible
issues; and
* improving the liquidity and trading in the secondary market through the implementation of aL market-
maker / primary dealer network, some system to provide market-makers with liquidity or bonds as a
source of last resort, and instruments and regulations that allow market-makers to carry out repo
transactions as well as the borrowing and lending of bonds.
Timing: 9/1998-1/2000 (16 months)
2.3 Accounting and Audit Reform (US$0.5;5 million)
The recent financial crisis in Korea has revealed that accounting practices have in many respects been
poor, financial disclosures have been inacdequate, and the quality of audit reports has generally been
unsatisfactory. Poor corporate governance along with weak audits also failed to reveal underlying deficiencies
and provide early warning signals to management, owners, investing publics, and the government about the
unsound business practices and imprudent financial management. The enhancement of financial
accountability and transparency in business dealings through improved accounting and audit practices needs to
be a high reform priority.
The Korea Institute for Chartered Public Accountants (KICPA) has not been in a position to take a
leadership role in ensuring the adaptation of consistent accounting and auditing standards, and i1i monitoring
the quality of auditing and accounting practices. The Government has been strongly involved in setting
standards, ensuring compliance, and regulating the profession. The role of the Government needs to be
reduced, while the role of the KICPA miLst be enhanced. In addition, an independent standard-setting
organization should be established. Strengthening of institutions responsible for ensuring accountability is
critical for the country's reform strategy, and have been agreed under the SAL. In the first half of this year,
the authorities have undertaken a range of measures to strengthen accounting and audit.
The Project would improve the 1transparency of accounting and audit practices, enhance the
institutional framework, and strengthen the financial oversight, through reviewing measures for:
* development and implementation of an enhanced Continuing Professional Education program for all
qualified accountants, and education of accountants with respect to the role of corporate governance,
including audit committees and effective internal audit;
* enhancement of the system of professional ethics, especially the independence rules, and of the code of
conduct for qualified accountants;
* rationalization of the institutional framework for setting standards, regulating, and overseeing the
accounting and auditing profession, through:
strengthening the role of KICPA so that KICPA will be responsible for setting auditing standards,
regulating, and monitoring the quality of its members, and ensuring implementation of standards
consistent with international standards;
* establishing an independent organization responsible for setting accounting standards;
* expanding the scope of external audit to include government-run enterprises, major hospitals and schools,
religious foundations, and other entities that enjoy major special tax benefits, and to introduce a market-
based contract system that eliminates the ceiling for the number of auditors' client firms; and
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* the feasibility of introducing audit committees of boards of directors for listed companies, banks, and other
financial institutions.
The above reviews would be carried out by consultant teams consisting of both international and local
experts. MOFE would recover part of the assistance costs from KICPA.
Timing: 9/1998-3/1999 (6 months)
Project Component 3: Debt Management Improvement (US$2.5 million)
(of which Loan: US$2.0 million)
Improved management of Government debt would contribute to future financial stability. The overall
objective would be sound management of government debt. The main outcomes to achieve this objective
would be strengthened professional capability, appropriate organizational arrangements, and improved
information and communication systems for debt management.
The component would address the following areas:
* a general information framework for sovereign debt management;
* an "early warning" model regarding foreign exchange exposure;
• a methodology for elaborating a debt profile and analysis;
e the quantification of currency and interest rate risk of the debt portfolio;
* the design of debt benchmarks that explicitly capture the levels of risk (liquidity, currency, refinancing,
and other risk) that the government is willing to tolerate (measuring the risk in millions of Won of
deviation from the debt service budget in a given year);
* the design of a hedging and financing plan for meeting the benchmarks, aimed at optimizing natural
coverage and the use of derivatives. The project would incorporate an explicit assetlliability framework,
as well as the selection, evaluation, and use of derivative products (currency and interest rate) when
natural coverage is no longer available to achieve the Benchmark; and
* informationlcommunication systems for the front, middle, and back office functions of public debt
management.
The project would cover all public debt, although it might initially start with external debt. It also
needs to include contingent liabilities such as guarantees, given the wide use of Government guarantees
provided to debt instruments issued by, for example, the Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Korea Asset
Management Corporation.
The main outputs of this component would be:
* consultant reports including detailed recommendations for each of areas listed above, based on about
fourteen personmonths of consultant input;
* capacity building mainly through on-the-job training and four workshops; and
* information/communication systems as indicated above, through the procurement of hardware and
software estimated at US$1 .2million.
Timing: 9/1998-9/2000 (24 months)
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Project Component 4: Corporate Restructuiring - US$32.7 million
(of which Loan: US$30.5 million)
The precarious financial position of Korea's large business groups ("chaebols') poses a severe
concern to Korea's financial institutions and economy. The 30 largest of the more tharn sixty chaebols
accounted late last year for about one million employees and over Won 110 trillion in bank loans. The
average debt/equity ratio for these chaebols increased from about 360 percent at end-96 to some 520 percent at
end-97 -- or to about 600 percent at end-97 if financial affiliates are included. By last May, seven chaebols
were in bankruptcy proceedings. Another ten chaebols with average debt/equity ratios of about 1,000 percent
have received about Won 2 trillion in emergency loans. The authorities have been concerned that several
major additional bankruptcies could provoke large-scale unemployment and social unrest, bank failures, and
outflows of foreign currency and portfolio investment, leading to additional pressure on the Won and interest
rates.
While this holding action proceeded, the Government created a Structural Reform Planning Unit
under FSC. This Unit had developed a proactive strategy for pursuing voluntary workouts. Elements of this
strategy include, inter alia, prompt "triage" amalysis of large corporates by the main creditor banks of their
chaebols; reliance on these lead banks to orchestrate voluntary workout negotiations; and creation of a
standing arbitration committee to resolve inter-creditor disputes.
In May, the creditor banks carried out a first, rough triage of their main borrowers. In June, the banks
announced to cut off further funding to 55 corporations that the lead banks had reported as most clearly non-
viable, including the former recipients of the emergency loans. For other weak borrower corporations, the
viability analysis is being deepened. The authorities have also instructed the chaebols to reduce their
debt/equity ratios substantially. In response, a number of chaebols are pursuing asset sales to foreign amd local
buyers, and the mobilization of additional equity capital especially through foreign investment. Reducing
financial leverage to sustainable prudential levels and restoring necessary liquidity will also require
widespread debt/equity conversions, various other forms of debt restructuring, and the closure of non-viable
business lines.
While some chaebols have been Ipushed into bankruptcy, and the threat of court-supervised
proceedings can usefully encourage debtors and creditors to reach agreement, Korea's courts and practitioners
face great difficulties developing, negotiating, and implementing a large number of large and complex
corporate reorganizations and liquidations. To avoid unnecessarily deep economic disruptions and destruction
of wealth, Korea needs institutions and procedures to facilitate timely completion of a large number of
voluntary debtor/creditor workouts. In June, financial institutions including the main creditor banks agreed
formally on the creation and operating rules of an arbitration committee (Corporate Restructuring Coordination
Committee) to resolve inter-creditor disputes. FSC has suggested to financial institutions a set of procedures
for voluntary,-credit-led work-out akin to the "London rules".
Extensive assistance by international experts will be required to further prepare and carry out
corporate restructuring of the necessary magnitude. Many of the required skills are highly specialized, rare in
a country that had earlier experienced hardly amy major corporate work-outs, and needed on a large scale due
to the depth and scope of Korea's corporate restructuring challenge. Moreover, the advisors should bring
international best practice to bear, and should have the capability to bring potential foreign investors to work-
out situations.
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The basic objective of the assistance project is to promote timely corporate restructurings, while
avoiding excessive economic dislocation and strengthening the ability of financial institutions to undertake
corporate workouts. In particular, the technical assistance is expected to have the following impact:
* decreases in debt/equity ratios for Korean corporates, especially among chaebols;
* restoration of chaebol liquidity and competitiveness, with rapid trickle-down benefits for SMEs;
* a more robust economy resulting from a shift from excessive reliance on debt financing toward greater
equity financing;
* avoidance of unnecessary strains on Korea's court system as a result of excessive numbers of
bankruptcies;
* building of sustainable institutional capacity, especially in the main creditor banks, for corporate
restructuring; and
* strengthening of procedures and institutions to support the timely conclusion of large and complex
voluntary workouts.
Financial advisory consortia would support some eight lead banks in developing, negotiating, and
enforcing the implementation of work-outs with large corporations belonging to chaebols. Moreover, in a
small number of particularly difficult cases of large work-outs, these advisory consortia would provide
additional capacity to lead banks to provide in-depth diagnostic reviews and restructuring assistance. These
consortia would have wide access to corporate management and management information in return for the
corporation's participation in voluntary work-out proceedings. The financial advisory consortium to each lead
bank would be expected to include an investment bank, strategic consulting firm, accounting firm, and law
firm.
Although each consortium would work directly at one lead bank in close day-to-day collaboration
with and under the operational supervision by the bank's professionals and managers, all the consortia would
be contracted by FSC. This would ensure a certain stability of the advisory assistance while many of the lead
banks will themselves undergo mergers or other forms of drastic restructuring. Moreover, some lead banks are
expected to be in a difficult financial situation, and may in any case require state financial support for
recapitalization. Finally, this arrangement would help provide FSC with early information on restructuring
needs in the banks' portfolio and thus facilitate the necessary coordination between bank and corporate
restructuring. However, FSC would over time recover costs of the assistance from the lead banks.
The main outputs of this component would be:
* Detailed recommendations for the development, negotiation, and implementation of voluntary
corporate/financial restructuring of chaebol or chaebol affiliates that provide fair, equitable, and realistic
treatment for all creditor financial institutions;
* business diagnostics and restructuring recommendations for corporates undergoing voluntary workout;
* support in the presentation of enterprise assessments and work-out proposals to the creditors' arbitration
committee; help with the assessment of alternative work-out proposals put forward to the committee; and
work with the lead banks in response to the committee's decisions;
* monthly progress reports as well as quarterly and ad hoc briefings to FSC about progress and issues in
corporate restructuring, which would facilitate FSC's anticipation of risks associated with widespread
corporate restructuring and inform continuous improvements of the institutional, regulatory, and policy
framework for market-based corporate restructuring; and
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* building institutional capacity for corporate work-out particularly in the main creditor banks through close
daily collaboration with bank staff and managers.
Timing: 8/1998-10/2000 (26 months), with strong front-loading.
Project Component 5: Corporate Legal/Regulatory Reform - US$1.7 million
(of which Loan: US$L.5 million)
5.1 Insolvency System (US$1.1 million)
Korean corporations are facing a sharp deterioration in both balance sheet solvency and liquidity, in
part as a consequence of poor management of their external liabilities. Trade debtors have traditionally relied
on deferred payment terms and deferral terms are lengthening in the face of the economic downturn and their
own financial difficulties. Debt finance raised by corporations in local currency is carrying historically high
interest rates. Foreign currency denominated debt service costs are vulnerable to wide swings in foreign
exchange rates. The combination of these effects with the high leverage ratios typical of Korean corporates has
led to increases in bankruptcy filings (around 4,000 per month) and, in the case of several large conglomerates,
to the suspension of normal payments to creditors and to the cessation of trading activities.
Against this background, the ultimate objective of the technical assistance is to help build a more
reliable corporate insolvency system that ensures a balance of stakeholder interests. In particular, the technical
assistance is expected to have the following impact:
* an increase in agreements between debtors and creditors for restructuring of liabilities outside the court
system;
* modernization of the insolvency laws to conform to international best practices;
* institutional strengthening of the court system to manage historically high levels of bankruptcy and
reorganization filings;
* increased confidence of creditors and increased public awareness of the role of insolvency systenms in a
modern economy; and
* strengthened ability of the authorities to make further adaptations in response to economic circumstances.
To achieve this, the assistance aims at the following outcomes:
* strengthened incentives for creditors and debtors to negotiate agreements for the reorganization of
corporate debt subject to confirmation by the courts that the agreement is fair to creditors;
* improved capacity of the courts to assess the potential viability of distressed corporations and to oversee
corporate reorganizations;
* evaluation of the benefits of the establishment of specialist bankruptcy courts;
* training provided to judges, officials and insolvency practitioners on the implementation of an improved
insolvency system;
* improvements identified to the principal laws concerned with corporate insolvency; and
* increased public awareness of the benefits for the economy of a reliable and credible insolvency system.
The sub-component would start with the establishment of the steering committee (including
representatives of the Ministry of Justice, MOFE, FSC, the bar association and the judiciary, and potentially
banks and the business community); the selection and appointment of consultants to carry out an evaluation of
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the insolvency system and a work plan for revision of laws, institutional strengthening and training; and the
presentation of the work plan to the implementation unit and approval of the plan.
The main outputs would then be:
* completion of the diagnostic review;
* presentation of the findings at a workshop on insolvency reform;
* finalization of the work plan;
* preparation of insolvency law changes;
* decision on possible establishment of specialist bankruptcy courts;
* training program for judges, officials and insolvency practitioners, including overseas training for select
court and Ministry of Justice officials; and
* wide public dissemination and education about the reformed insolvency system.
The main inputs would be the engagement of consultants; the organization and delivery of a
workshop; the engagement of trainers; and the use of public media and other means of dissemination.
Timing: 9/1998-12/2000 (15 months).
5.2 Corporate Governance Framework (US$0.6 million)
Govemment policy for the Korean financial sector is to encourage an expanded role for the capital
markets in the provision of both debt and equity financing and thereby to reduce the demands on the banking
system and to improve liability structures for non-financial firms. Other benefits of an expanded role for the
capital markets will be a demand for high-quality financial information and the emergence of institutional
investors seeking investment opportunities for inflows gathered from the general public. The two pillars of this
shift will be the adoption of international best practices for financial reporting, and credible mechanisms to
encourage monitoring of corporate performance by directors, shareholders, creditors, regulators and the media.
T'he assistance would address the latter of the two above pillars: the adoption of credible mechanisms
for corporate monitoring by stakeholders. In particular, the assistance would be expected to have the
following impact:
* the adoption of clear standards for the duties of care and loyalty of directors;
* the creation of incentives for directors to monitor managerial actions to ensure that the best interests of the
company are served;
* increased independence of corporate directors from management and dominant shareholder interests;
* generally improved accountability and effective corporate decision-making; and
* enhanced ability to make further adaptations in response to economic circumstances.
To achieve this, the assistance aims at the following outcomes:
* To strengthen and refine the duties of care and loyalty owed by corporate directors to companies and
shareholders;
* to evaluate, in the Korean context, the role and functions of corporate directors as policy-makers and
monitors of managerial performance;
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* to study and provide recommendations on the selection, appointment and removal of corporate directors
and their accountability to shareholders;
* to evaluate the benefits of the appointment of outside directors and their roles in strengthening the
effectiveness of outside auditors and in managerial oversight;
* to strengthen the rights of shareholders to obtain information, present proposals, approve the appointment
and removal of directors, and hold management and directors accountable for corporate actions; and
* to strengthen the capacity of Ministry of Justice and MOFE officials with regard to the framework for
corporate governance.
A steering committee would be established including representatives of the Ministry of Justice,
MOFE, and the securities supervisory authority, and potentially of the business community and shareholder
advocacy groups.
Main outputs of this component woulid be:
* a study of the role and functions of boards of directors as users of corporate financial inform,ation for
policy-making purposes and to monitor managerial performance;
- preparation of changes to laws to strengthen the duties of directors to act in the best interests of the
company and to reduce or eliminate barriers to the exercise of minority shareholder rights;
- a study of the possible introduction of class action law suits by shareholders of listed companies;
- a workshop on corporate governance reform to present the findings of these studies; and
* overseas training for selected Ministry.
The main inputs would be the engagement of consultants for the above two first outputs, and further
consultants for the third output, as well as the organization and delivery of a workshop that would involve
these consultants and other speakers as resource persons.
Timing: 9/1998-12/2000 (15 months)
Project Component 6: Competition Policy-- US$0.61 million
(of which Loan: US$0.42 million)
Under the Structural Adjustment Loan program, the government of Korea has agreed to strengthen the
administration and enforcement of competition policy. The intended impact is to help foster competition and
efficiency in the financial and industrial sectors. Aimed at this ultimate objective, the outcomes of the
assistance should be a certain increase in the effectiveness of the Korean Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), and
strengthened application of the Fair Trade Act. This would be achieved through enhanced skills and
knowledge of KFTC staff; experience in applying selected international best practice to local circurnstances;
and the development of solutions to some specific technical issues.
The main outputs of this component would be:
* Some policy statements, guidelines, regulations, and procedures drafted with the help of knowledge and
inputs provided by experts from OECD countries;
* two training workshops; and
* intemships for KFTC officials in OECD member country competition offices, combined with the
participation in overseas seminars/workshops.
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The main activities would be:
* Sharing of knowledge from various countries, including OECD best practice, as well as direct inputs into
select draft policy statements, regulations, procedures, etc., by three advisors visiting KFTC for an average
of two months each. International experts would be drawn from OECD member country competition
offices, recognized experts in the field, legal and economic practitioners;
* training seminars / workshops, to the extent possible organized back-to-back with events involving some
of the same lecturers, and/or organized jointly with other organizations such as the OECD. In Korea,
organizations such as KDI, KIET, Universities and individual professionals would be relied on. Two
events are foreseen, with the first event being planned for September 1998;
* combined intemships/training for about six KFTC officials abroad for an average period of three months,
and for two additional officials for an average stay of nine months. These visits could be arranged
through universities, other training institutions, and OECD country competition offices. KFTC currently
has already six staff abroad in secondments at competition policy offices for a year or more, funded from
other sources.
Timing: 9/1998-9/2000 (24 months)
Project Component 7: Project Implementation Support - US$0.22 million
(of which Loan: US$0.20 million)
A Project Implementation Unit (PIU) has been established within the Planning and Administration
Department of FSC, and a second PIU is being established within the Treasury Division of MOFE. These
PiUs would, inter alia, manage special accounts, carry out accounting, engage independent auditors, prepare
and send disbursement requests to the Bank, advise the technical implementing agencies in procurement
matters consistent with Bank guidelines, and compile project progress reports.
Each of the two PIUs would use US$100,000 funding under the Loan to cover expenses for consultant
services and training including, inter alia:
* PIU staff training in procurement, disbursement, and other technical matters;
* consultant services regarding financial accounting under World Bank projects; and
* services of independent auditors.
Timing: 8/1998 - 12/2001 (40 months)
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ANNEX 3: EST'IMATED PROJECT COSTS
(US$ million)
Project Component Local Foreign Total 113RD
Financing
1. Financial Sector Supervision and Crisis 0.9 8.7 9.6 7.30
Management
1.1 FSC Institutional Development 0.4 4.2 4.6 3.30
1.2 Financial Sector Crisis Management Capability 0.5 4.5 5.0 4.00
2. Securities Markets Development 0.4 1.6 2.0 1.44
2.1 Market Regulation, Infrastructure, Industry 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.56
2.2 Government Bond Markets 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.38
2.3 Accounting and Audit Reform 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.50
3. Government Debt Management 0.6 1.9 2.5 2.00
4. Corporate Restructuring by Lead Banks 1.8 30.9 32.7 30.50
5. Corporate LegaURegulatory Reform 0.3 1.4 1.7 1.50
5.1 Insolvency System 0.2 0.9 1.1 1.05
5.2 Governance Framework 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.45
6. Competition Policy 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.42
7. Project Implementation Support 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.20
Total Baseline Cost 4.2 45.1 49.3 43.36
Physical Contingencies 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.60
Price Contingencies 0.3 4.2 4.5 4.04
Total Project Cost 4.7 49.8 54.5 48.00
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ANNEX 4: COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS SUMMARY
Not Applicable
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ANNEX 5: ]FINANCIAL SUMMARY
Years Ending June 30
US$ million
Implementation Period
FY99 FY00 FY0I FY02 TOTAL
Project Costs 28.0 20.0 5.4 1.1 54.5
Financing Sources
IBRD 23.0 19.0 5.0 1.0 48.0
Government 5.0 1.0 0.4 0.1 6.5
Total 28.0 20.0 5.4 1.1 54.5
Page 32 ANNEX 6
ANNEX 6: PROCUREMENT AND DISBURSEMENT
ARRANGEMENTS
Procurement
Procurement methods (Table A). Goods shall be procured in accordance with the provisions of
Section I of the "Guidelines for Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits" published by the Bank in
January 1995 and revised in January and August 1996 and September 1997 (the Guidelines). Procurement of
consultants would be done according to the provisions of the "Selection and Employment of Consultants by
World Bank Borrowers" (the Consultant Guidelines). All consultants assignments will follow the Bank's
Standard Request for proposals dated April 1998. Except as otherwise provided, consultants' services shall be
procured under contracts awarded in accordance with the provisions of the Consultant Guidelines applicable
to quality- and cost-based selection of consultants.
Thresholds for procurement methods and prior review (Table B).
Single Source Selection. This project has been prepared in response to an economic crisis and rapid
selection of consultants will be essential in one of the components. Services under sub-component 1.2
(Financial Sector Crisis Management Capability) may, with the Bank's prior agreement, be procured in
accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 3.8 through 3.11 of the Consultant Guidelines.
All consultant contracts not procured through single source selection, and exceeding $200,000 would
be advertised in Development Business.
Selection Based on Consultants' Qualifications. Services estimated to cost less than $100,000
equivalent per contract may be procured under contracts awarded in accordance with the provisions of
paragraphs 3.1 and 3.7 of the Consultant Guidelines.
Individual Consultants. Tasks that meet the requirements set forth in paragraph 5.01 of the Consultant
Guidelines shall be procured under contracts awarded to individual consultants in accordance with the
provisions of paragraphs 5.1 through 5.3 of the Consultant Guidelines.
Table A of this Section shows the project costs by procurement arrangements. The total expenditure
on equipment is limited to US$1.2 million. There will be only one international competitive bidding (ICB) in
the Project. Equipment may be procured using international shopping up to an aggregate amount of US$
600,000, and national shopping up to an aggregate amount of US$300,000. At least three quotations from
qualified suppliers must be obtained.
Requirements of prior review of procurement of consulting services and equipment are summarized
in Table B.
Disbursement
Allocation of loan proceeds (Table C). Expenditures for individual contracts of equipment and
services, for which prior review by the Bank is not required, will be disbursed against Statement of
Expenditures. For expenditures incurred on the basis of Statements of Expenditures all records evidencing
such information must be retained by the project entity until at least one year after the Bank has received the
audit report for the fiscal year in which the last withdrawal from the loan account is made. Full documentation
for all contracts requiring the Bank's prior review will be submitted. Disbursements, representing mainly
expenditures under short term implementation assistance, will be made over a period of three and a half years.
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Since the Govemment wishes to advance rapidly, with respect to crisis management capability in the financial
sectors, corporate restructuring by lead banks, and consolidation of financial sector supervision in the newly
created FSC, retroactive financing, not to exceed US$4.8 million (10% of Loan amount), would be applied to
finance eligible expenditure, made after June 26, 1998.
Use of statements of expenses. The Bank may require withdrawals from the Loan Account to be made
on the basis of statements of expenses for: (i) goods under contracts costing less than US$300,000 equivalent
each; (ii) contracts for the employment of consulting firms valued at less than US$100,000 each; and, (iii)
contracts for the employment of individuals valued at less than US$50,000 equivalent each.
Special accounts. Two special accounts in US dollars will be established at commercial banks
acceptable to the Bank. A special account managed by FSC will have an authorized allocation of US$3.0
million, and the second special account, at MOFE, will have an authorized allocation of US$0.5 million. The
amount of the initial deposit in FSC's special account, however, would be limited to US$1.5 million, until the
aggregate amount of withdrawals by FSC from the Loan plus outstanding special commitments will equal or
exceed the equivalent of US$5.0 million to correspond to anticipated expenditures in the first months of
project execution. In the case of MOFE's special account, the according amounts will be US$0.25 million and
US$1.0 million, respectively. The special accounts will be replenished monthly to assure liquidity of funds,
and all replenishment applications would be accompanied by reconciled bank statements from the depository
bank showing all transactions in the respective special account.
The allocation of Loan proceeds is provided in Table C of this Section.
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Annex 6, Table A: Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements
(in US$million equivalent)
Expenditure Category Procurement Method Total Cost
ICB NCB Other NBF (including contingencies)
1. Works - -
2. Goods 0.6 - 0.6 - 1.3
(0.6) (0.6) (1.3)
3. Services - - 48.1 - 53.2
(42.2) (46.7)
4. Miscellaneous - - - --
Total 0.6 - 48.7 - 54.5
(0.6) (42.8) (48.0)
Notes: NBF = Not Bank-financed (includes elements procured under parallel cofinancing procedures,
consultancies under trust funds, any reserved procurement, and any other miscellaneous items).
Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan.
Items listed under "other" will be procured through international or national shopping.
Page 35 ANNEX 6
Annex 6, Table B: Thresholds for Procurement Methods and Prior Review
Expenditure Contract Value Procurement Contracts Subject to
Category (Threshold) Method Prior Review / Estimated
Total Value Subject to
Prior Review
US$ thousands
1. Goods
>300 ICB All.
<250 International Shopping First two contracts, and
contracts of $ 100,000 or
more.
<100 National Shopping None
2. Services
Firms >100 Quality and Cost Based All. Shortlist and request
Selection (QCBS), except for proposals only:
in services identified Below $200,000.
below.
>100 Single Source Selection All. Shortlist and request
for Project Services for proposals only:
Identified in the Loan Below $200,000.
Agreement *
<100 Single Source Selection TORs only.
or based on Consultants'
Qualifications (CQ)
Individuals >50 Consultant guidelines All.
Section V
<50 Consultant guidelines TORs only.
Section V
Total value of contracts subject to prior review: $42.Om
* Where rapid selection of consultants will be essential due to the critical economic situation (para. 3.9 of the
Consultant Guidelines). Single-source selection may be used for sub- component 1.2, Financial Sector Crisis
Management Capability.
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Annex 6, Table C: Procurement Plan
Main Consultant Contracts Notice for Expression Request Proposals Contract Consultants
Expression of Interest for Received Award Start
of Interest Submitted Proposals
1.1 Development of Financial Supervision 8/98 9/98 9/98 10/98 10/98 10/98
Strategies, Policies, Procedures, Capabilities
1.1 FSC Human Resource Development Policy 8/98 9/98 10/98 11/98 11/98 11/98
1.1 Implementation of New Organizational 8/98 8/98 8/98 9/98 9/98 9/98
Structure of FSC
1.2 Strategy for Financial Sector Crisis - - 7/98 8/98 8/98 8/98
Management (sole-source procurement)
2.1 Securities Markets Regulatory Framework 8/98 9/98 9/98 10/98 10/98 11/98
2.1 Advice on the Rationalization of Securities - - 8/98 8/98 9/98 9/98
Markets Architecture (first contract; sole-
source procurement)
2.1 Bond Market Study 8/98 9/98 9/98 10/98 10/98 11/98
2.2 GOK Bond Management Policy Study 8/98 9/98 9/98 10/98 10/98 11/98
2.3 Review of Measures to Improve Accounting 7/98 8/98 8/98 9/98 10/98 10/98
and Audit (first contract)
3 Debt Management Improvement (first set of - - 8-9/98 8-9/98 9-10/98 9-11/98
contracts; sole-source procurement)
4 Corporate Restructuring (8 similar contracts) 7/98 7/98 7/98 8/98 8-10/98 8-10/98
5.1 Insolvency System Diagnostic and Workplan 8/98 9/98 9/98 11/98 12/98 12/98
5.2 Study/Advice on Corporate Governance 8/98 9/98 9/98 11/98 12/98 12/98
(main contract)
6 Competition Policy (first contract; sole- - - 8/98 9/98 9/98 9/98
source procurement)
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Annex 6, Tablle D: Allocation of Loan Proceeds
Expenditure Category Amount in Financing Percentage
US$million
Consultants' Services and Training 42.2 100% of all foreign expenditures,
100% of local expenditures
Equipment 1.2 100% of foreign expenditures,
100% of local expenditures
ex factory cost), and
80% of local expenditures
for other items procured locally
Unallocated 4.6
Total 48.0
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ANNEX 7: PROJECT PROCESSING BUDGET AND SCHEDULE
Planned Actual
(At final PCD stage)
A. Project Budget (US$'000) Preparation: 300
B. Project Schedule
Time taken to prepare the project (months) 3
First Bank mission (identification) 4/27/1998 4/27/1998
Appraisal mission departure 6/18/1998 6/25/1998
Negotiations 6/29/1998 7/14/1998
Planned Date of Effectiveness 9/1/1998 8/20/1998
Prepared by: Ministry of Finance and Economy
Preparation assistance: Special Financial Operations budget
Bank staff who worked on the project included:
Name Specialty
Klaus Lorch Task Team Leader
Hong-Chul Ahn Deputy Task Team Leader
Hongjoo Hahm Initial Task Team Leader
Katie Shaw Team Assistance
Ira Lieberman Corporate Restructuring
William Mako Corporate Restructuring
David Scott Financial Sector
Mario Reyes Vidal Banking Sector
Laura Ard Banking Sector
Clemente del Valle Securities Markets
Noritaka Akamatsu Securities Markets
Douglas Webb Corporate Governance
Rughvir Khemani Competition Policy
Behdad Nowroozi Accounting/Audit; Financial Management
Clifford Garstang Legal Matters
Gaye Lindsey Disbursement
Jean Aden Environment
Surinder Malik Peer Review
W. Bernard Drum Peer Review
Arvind Gupta Peer Review
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ANNEX 8: DOCUMENTS IN THE PROJECT FILE*
A. Project Implementation Plan
B. Bank Staff Assessments
None.
C. Other
Background Notes on Corporate Financial Structure and on Lead Banks for Corporate
Restructuring
*Including electronic files.
Page 40
Annex 9
ANNEX 9: STATEMENT OF LOANS AND CREDITS
A. IBRD Loans and IDA Credits in the Operations Portfolio (as of July 17, 1998)
Difference
Betweerl expected
Originial Amount in US$ Millionis and actual Last ARPP
Loan or Fiscal di sbursem:ents a/ Supervision Rating b/
Project ID Credit Year Borrower Purpose
No. IBRD IDA Cancellations Undisbursed Orig Frm Rev'd Dev Obj Imp Prog
Nueuber of Closed Loanis/ciedits: 125
Active Loans
KR-t E-4170 113R 361:i0 I1993 REP OF KOREA PIRL DISI & SEC MGMT 120.00 0.00 0.00 19.77 19.77 19.77 S S
KR-PE-4 171 I BRI) 1if,20 1993 GOVT OF KOREA ENVIRON RESEARCH & E 60.00 0.00 0.00 8.92 9.40 0.00 HS UiS
KR-PE-4169 IBRD 35900 1993 ROK SEOUL & KWANGJU SEWE 110.00 0.00 64.39 11.80 76.18 0.00 S S
KR-PE-4174 IBRD 36940 1994 GOK ENV TECHNOLOGY DEVEL 90.00 0.00 0.00 8.29 10.41 0.00 HS S
KR-PE-4168 IBRD 36930 1994 GOK SCI & IECH EDUC SECT 190.00 0.00 0.00 39.42 4.40 0.00 13S UIS
KR-PE-4172 IBRD 36890 1994 KOREA GOVERNMENT FINCL INTERMEDIATION 100.00 0.00 .18 1.10 1.28 .40 S S
KR-PE-35019 IBRD 38300 1995 GOK WASIE DISPOSAL PROJE 75.00 0.00 0.00 55.46 36.97 0.00 S S
KR-PE-4175 IBRD 38280 1995 KOREA GOVERNMENT PUSAN URB TRANSP.&MG 100.00 0.00 0.00 46.33 34.02 0.00 HS HS
KR-PE-4173 IBRD 37930 1995 KOREAN GOVENMENT PORTS DEV & ENVIRON 100.00 0.00 3.07 55.94 45.01 0.00 S S
Total 945.00 0.00 67.64 247.03 237.44 20.17
Active Loans Closed Loaris Total
Total Disbursed (IBRD and IDA); 630.33 12,185.36 12,815.69
of wt.icl has been repaid: .19 6,212.88 6,213.07
Tut "Ii now he:ld ty 1thb dlnd ilA: 877.1l6 5,974.22 6,851.38
Amount sold 0.00 131.51 131.51
Of which repaid : 0.00 131.51 131.51
iT,l 3 UdiTA,;hX-l : 247.03 1 .75 248.78
a. 1.tenided urisburleme:ts to date minus actual disbuirsem,erts to date aS projected at appraisal.
b. Following the Y314 Annual Review of Portfolio performance (ARPI'), a letter based system was initroduced (IIS = highly Satisfactory, S = satisfactory, U = unsatisfactory,
IIU - hiqlhly unsat isfactoriy): see proposed Improvements in Project wed Portfolio Performance Ratinig Methodology (SecM94-901), August 23, 1994.
Note:
Disbur setent data is updated at the end of the first week of the month.
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B. Statement of IFC's Committed and Disbursed Portfolio
(As of June 30, 1998, in US$ million)
Committed Disbursed
IFC IFC
FY Approval Company Loan Equity Quasi Partic Loan Equity Quasi Part.
1968/74/76/77/78/80/90/ KLTI CB 25.00 15.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.12 0.00 0.00
94/98
1971/74/76/79/80/82/85/ Hana Bank 50.00 21.55 0.00 0.00 30.00 21.55 0.00 0.00
R8/9 I /Q4/97/98/97
1974/76/77/79/80/84/85/ LG Electronics 0.00 11.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.43 0.00 0.00
87/88/89/91/92/93/96
1977/79/87/90 KDLC 0.00 1.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.22 0.00 0.00
1983/91 KDIC 0.00 1.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.72 0.00 0.00
1985 KDIC-Seoshin 0.00 .31 0.00 0.00 0.00 .31 0.00 0.00
1985 KDIC-SK Chemical 0.00 .12 0.00 0.00 0.00 .12 0.00 0.00
Total Portfolio: 75.00 51.47 0.00 0.00 30.00 51.47 0.00 0.00
Approvals Pending Commitment
Loan Equity Quasi Partic
1988 GOLD STAR (12)RI 0.00 2.62 0.00 0.00
1998 H&Q KOREA 0.00 30.00 0.00 0.00
1998 HANA BANK 0.00 21.86 0.00 0.00
Total Pending Commitment: 0.00 54.48 0.00 0.00
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ANNEX 10: KOREA AT A GLANCE
PRICES and GOVERNMENT FINANCE
Domestic prices 1975 1985 1995 1996 Inflation (%)
(% change) 12 -
Consumer prices 25.2 2.4 4.5 5.0 10
Implicit GDP deflator 26.1 5.6 5.6 3.4 3
Government finance 4
(% of GDP) o2:_E
Current revenue 15.2 20.7 20.3 21.5 91 92 93 94 95 96
Current budget balance .. 5.9 6.1 7.3 -G DP def -O--CPI
Overall surplus/deficit 2.0 0.7 0.3 0.3
TRADE
1975 1985 1995 1996 Export and Import levels (bill. US$)
(millions US$)
Total exports (fob) 4,945 30,282 125,058 129,715 160 _
Clothing .. .. 4,958 4,221 140
Footwear .. .. 1,506 1,236 120
Manufactures .. .. 106,743 107,175 100T
Total imports (cif) 7,274 31,136 135,119 150,339 4 0 
Food . .. 5,925 7,265
Fuel andJ energy . .. 19,013 24,284 .
Capital goods 49,437 54,675 2E
Export price index (1990=100) 31 89 114 114 90 91 92 93 94 95 93
Import price index (1990=100) 34 97 115 115 LiExports o Iports
Terms of trade (1985=100) 87 100 102 90 p
BALANCE of PAYMENTS
(millions OS$) 1975 1985 1995 1996 Current account balance to GDP ratio (%)
Exports of goods and services 5,799 32,038 149,446 156,987 1 _
Imports oF goods and services 7,543 30,554 155,834 182,758 l
Resource balance -1,745 1,484 -6,388 -25,771 0 'h |90 9291 93 X4 95
Net income -369 -3,183 -2,276 -2,498 4 t
Net current transfers .. .. .. . -2 l
Current account balance,
before official capital transfers -1,889 -758 -8,948 -23,716 -3T
Financing items (net) 2,254 950 15,988 23,741 |4
Changes in net reserves -365 -192 -7,040 -25 .1s
Memo:
Reserves including gold (mill. US$) 786.0 2,900.7 32,712.1 34,073.1
Conversion rate (locabUS$) 484.0 870.0 771.3 804.5
EXTERNAL DEBT and RESOURCE FLOWS
1980 1994 1995 1996
(millions US$) Composition of total debt, 1994 (mill. US$)
Total debt outstanding and disbursed 29,480 54,542 78,438 160,700
IBRD 1,723 2,380 2,163 1,841
IDA 113 85 82 79 A: 2380 6:85
D. 635Total debt service 4,449 7,923 D:635
IBRD 211 773 630 527 G:13890 E: 6313
IDA , 2 4 4 4
Composition of net resource flows
Official grants ..
Official creditors ..
Private creditors ..
Foreign direct investment 6 -1,318 -1,880 -1,981
Portfolio equity 0 7,276 8,518 11,207 F 17690
World Bank program
Commitments .. .. A - IBRD E - Bilateral
Disbursements 254 282 144 210 6-IDA D-Othermultilateral F-Private
Principal repayments 67 592 464 389 C - IMF G - Short-term
Netflows 187 -310 -320 -179 .
Interest payments 146 186 169 139
Net trainsfers 41 -496 -489 -318
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